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ABS TRACT
Background and objectives: Depression is a major medical problem diagnosed in an increasing
proportion of people and for which commonly prescribed psychoactive drugs are frequently ineffective.
Development of treatment options may be facilitated by an evolutionary perspective; several adaptive
reasons for proneness to depression have been proposed. A common feature of many explanations is
that depressive behaviour is a way to avoid costly effort where benefits are small and/or unlikely.
However, this viewpoint fails to explain why low mood persists when the situation improves. We
investigate whether a behavioural rule that is adapted to a stochastically changing world can cause
inactivity which appears similar to the effect of depression, in that it persists after the situation has
improved.
Methodology: We develop an adaptive learning model in which an individual has repeated choices of
whether to invest costly effort that may result in a net benefit. Investing effort also provides information
about the current conditions and rates of change of the conditions.
Results: An individual following the optimal behavioural strategy may sometimes remain inactive when
conditions are favourable (i.e. when it would be better to invest effort) when it is poorly informed about
the current environmental state. Initially benign conditions can predispose an individual to inactivity
after a relatively brief period of negative experiences.
Conclusions and implications: Our approach suggests that the antecedent factors causing depressed
behaviour could go much further back in an individual s history than is currently appreciated. The
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insights from our approach have implications for the ongoing debate about best treatment options for
patients with depressive symptoms.
KEYWORDS : behavioural shutdown model; low mood; major depressive disorder; psychic pain
hypothesis; reactive depression
Pain or suffering of any kind, if long continued, causes
depression and lessens the power of action, yet it is well
adapted tomake a creature guard against any greater or
sudden evil.
Charles Darwin
INTRODUCTION
Depression is a state of low mood, associated with a
lack of motivation, which affects millions of people
worldwide [1–3]. This figure is increasing, and there
is an ongoing debate about whether the condition is
actually becoming more prevalent or is being over-
diagnosed [4, 5]. Some authorities argue that normal
sadness is increasingly diagnosed as depression,
with negative consequences for the patients con-
cerned [6, 7]. Normal sadness is triggered by external
events in life. When these events are inadequately
dealt with by the patient, depression may result [8, 9].
It has been argued that depression should only be
diagnosed when there are no causal external factors
[7] but support for this is mixed [10]. For example, it
is generally agreed that depression should not be
diagnosed in cases of bereavement, but some have
argued that this exclusion should be extended to
other causal factors of sadness [11]. The difficulty
is in assessing what factors should be taken to be
causal. In this article, we focus on healthy reactive
behaviour (which might easily be interpreted as ‘de-
pression’), rather than mental disorders. Although
we describe the two as distinct, it is possible that the
effect of strong reactions may increase the likelihood
of more permanent changes in brain function (per-
haps resulting in depression as a mental disorder).
We do not address that possibility in this article but
focus on why reactive effects can persist for a long
time. Two recent meta-analyses have shown that
pharmacological treatments are effective only in
the most severe cases of depression [12, 13] so it
is clear that preventing and curing depression re-
quire a deeper understanding of how it arises and
persists.
Evolutionary psychiatry has provided several ex-
planations for depression based on the view that it
is an adaptive response to a problem [14–17] (see
Coyne [18] for a critique); this is an approach that has
been applied to other medical issues [19]. Common
to many of these explanations is the view that emo-
tions, and their associated disorders, have evolved
as mechanisms for guiding adaptive behaviour
[20, 21]. The behavioural shutdown hypothesis of
depression [22, 23] supposes that individuals should
become inactive if cues from the environment indi-
cate that activity would decrease their Darwinian fit-
ness. The variability of environmental conditions
faced by most organisms—including ancestral
humans—means that it will sometimes pay to be
active, such as when food is abundant, and some-
times pay to be inactive, such as when food is scarce
or when there is danger [24]. Depression would then
be an appropriate response to the current conditions
if the affective experience acts as a mechanism for
implementing appropriate behaviour.
Many theories which explain depression as an
adaptive response to environmental conditions fail
to explain why low mood persists when conditions
improve. Individuals typically do not have perfect
knowledge about current conditions, because con-
ditions change over time and outcomes are stochas-
tic. Faced with this uncertainty, animals will have
evolved psychological mechanisms to learn about
the conditions and respond appropriately given their
current information [25–27]. We shall assume that
evolution has generated cognitive and decision-
making processes that adjust behaviour optimally
in response to data received about the environmen-
tal conditions. Despite an individual following the
optimal strategy (producing the best possible be-
haviour, given the data available), an external obser-
ver who knows the conditions perfectly (hereafter
referred to simply as an ‘omniscient observer’)
may witness seemingly maladaptive behaviour
[28, 29]. It would be easy for such an observer to infer
a psychological disorder, even though the strategy is
optimal. Inactivity under good conditions, which is
not in itself beneficial and may appear similar to
some forms of depression, may therefore arise from
an optimal mechanism. This is the angle that we
explore in this article.
To study how such seemingly maladaptive behav-
iour may arise from optimal decisions in a variable
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and uncertain environment, we consider a simple
scenario in which environmental conditions are
either ‘good’ (where rewards are likely to be obtained
when the individual is active) or ‘bad’ (where re-
wards are less likely) and can switch between those
states over time. At any time, the switching rate is
either fast or slow. The switching rate can itself also
occasionally switch from one rate to the other.
Although this is a crude simplification of the pattern
of change in real environments, it serves as a con-
venient way to illustrate some general principles.
We assume that natural selection has resulted in
individuals that are adapted to the probabilities of
environmental change, so that they learn optimally
about the probable state of the world from the out-
comes of their actions. We find that the optimal
strategy for maximizing reward rate can result in a
significant minority of individuals failing to take ad-
vantage of good conditions.
THE MODEL
We consider an individual whose behavioural strat-
egy has evolved to maximize its long-term rate of
reward (e.g. net rate of energy gain, [30]). The indi-
vidual makes repeated decisions of whether to
expend effort (hereafter ‘trying’) or be inactive (here-
after ‘resting’) for one time step. Resting is assumed
to have a payoff of zero. Trying will result in success
or failure. If the outcome is failure, the individual
receives a negative payoff, Z, reflecting the costs of
expending effort (e.g. the extra metabolic cost of
foraging). If the outcome is success, the individual
receives a positive payoff,X, reflecting the net benefit
of the reward (e.g. the energy of a food item minus
the extra metabolic cost of foraging).
We assume that the probability of success when
trying depends on the current environmental condi-
tions; it takes one of two values, Eg or Eb (with
Eg> Eb, representing good and bad environmental
states, respectively), but will sometimes change be-
tween them. The probability that the environmental
conditions change from good to bad or vice versa in a
given time step (hereafter the ‘switching probabil-
ity’) is either f or s, with f>s such that f (fast
switching) implies a more changeable environment
than s (slow switching). Figure 1 shows the four
possible environmental situations: good or bad con-
ditions, with either a fast or slow switching rate. We
assume that evolution has resulted in individuals
behaving as if they know the values of Eg, Eb, s
and f but do not know which of the four
combinations of those values (see Fig. 1) holds at
any given moment. There is a meta-probability, ,
that the switching probability changes in a given
time step, but its value is very small, such that the
switching probability is highly unlikely to change
during a time step. We assume that behaviour is
evolutionarily adapted to this meta-probability.
Initially the individual has no knowledge of the
current probability of success (Eg or Eb) nor the cur-
rent switching probability (f or s). To maximize its
long-term rate of reward, the individual learns about
the current values and uses this information to de-
cide whether to rest or try at any given moment.
Trying, and getting a success or a failure, will provide
information about which of the probabilities of suc-
cess is most likely. Repeated trying will also inform
the individual about the current switching probabil-
ity. At any given moment, we can summarize the
individual’s knowledge about the environment
in terms of three joint probabilities, P(Eg, f),
P(Eg, s), P(Eb, f), from which the fourth probability
can be calculated, as the four joint probabilities
must sum to 1. The position of an individual in this
belief space is updated in a Bayesian manner
(see Supplementary Appendix). Using dynamic
programming [31, 32], we can then find the optimal
strategy that specifies whether it is better to rest or
try given the current estimates. The optimal strategy
will try when the environmental conditions are likely
to be good, but it may also be best to try when con-
ditions are relatively uncertain, to gain information
for future time steps (Fig. 1b). A full technical
description of the model is provided in the
Supplementary Appendix.
We then track the trajectory of individuals follow-
ing the optimal strategy through this probability
space as they make decisions and learn about their
environment. We use the same set of parameter
values throughout (Eg = 0.8, Eb = 0.2, f = 0.4,
s = 0.01, X= 1, Z=1, g= 0.001).Note, however,
that the insights gleaned from the model are not
dependent on any particular set of parameter values.
With Z =X (as we assume) it is important that the
probability of success is sometimes>0.5, because it
is then worth trying, and sometimes <0.5, because
(from the perspective of someone who knows the
conditions) it is then better to rest. However, since
the individual does not have perfect knowledge, it
should sometimes try even if success is less likely
than failure, because the individual gains informa-
tion by trying. By using probabilities of success of 0.8
in the good environment and 0.2 in the bad
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environment, we ensure that an individual can, after
only a few attempts, gain a significant amount of
information about which environment it is in. With
such different probabilities of success, it is also im-
portant that the individual makes the correct choice.
CHARACTERIZING DEPRESSION
Numerous definitions of depression have been
proposed, reflecting the wide range of different
perspectives on this multifaceted phenomenon.
Nevertheless, as Gilbert [1, p.143] says,
Figure 1. (a) The four possible environmental situations at any given time. In the fast-switching case (f), the environmental
state changes between high (good, Eg) and low (bad, Eb) reward probabilities frequently (thick solid arrow). With a low switching
probability (s), the environmental state tends to remain good or bad for a long time (thin solid arrow). With a very small
probability , the switching rate can change between fast and slow (dashed arrows). (b) Approximate form of the optimal strategy,
to aid intuition. The individual’s belief about the current environmental situation is three-dimensional, which is difficult to
visualize. Here, we represent belief state in two-dimensions, as though we had summed across the joint probabilities to obtain
the most common decision with respect to each combination of P(Eg) and P(f). The circles at each corner show the appropriate
behaviour if knowledge were perfect (i.e. each probability is either 0 or 1). The individual should try (green shading) if the
probability of good conditions (i.e. a high reward probability) is large and rest (red shading) if it is small. Due to the need to
learn about current conditions, there is a range of belief space where the individual should try even if the probability of a reward is
low (purple shading). The boundary between trying and resting (dashed line) is influenced by the probability that the switching
rate is fast, because this alters the value of information
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depression has some built-in pattern; it is a
potential brain state organization and any of us
are potential sufferers. It will have great phenotypic
variability from person to person but still there will
be commonalities; an experience of misery, low
levels of explorative behaviour, loss of energy,
negative self-organizations and perceptions of
inferiority and poor assertiveness.
Depression can vary in magnitude from mild to
very severe [33]. In the most severe cases, it seems
clear that the phenomenon is a form of illness.
In less severe cases, it is not clear whether depressed
experiences and behaviour are caused by a malfunc-
tion of the brain or the reaction of a healthy brain to
the set of experiences. In this article, we focus on the
latter possibility, of depressive behaviour being a
reactive occurrence in a healthy individual.
In affective terms, depression is widely recognized
as a persistent state of low mood, involving a suite of
correlated changes in mental processes affecting
motivation and cognition [34]. The mental processes
govern the behaviour of the individual, and it is that
resultant behaviour which is subject to natural selec-
tion. We therefore focus on resultant behaviour rather
than the mental processes that generate that behav-
iour, on the assumption that evolution has produced
mental processes that implement the optimal
strategy.
Even from a behavioural perspective, and within
the framework of this simple model (where we are
concerned purely with behaviour; i.e. the explorative
option of trying), it is difficult to define depression in
a satisfactory manner. In part, this is because de-
pression is regarded in different ways; this article
deals with different meanings, each of which has
different problems, as identified later.
(1) It would be easy to characterize depres-
sion as resting when it would be better
to try (i.e. resting despite success being
more likely than failure). However, be-
cause the environment can switch type,
it would be strange to regard an individ-
ual that had experienced repeated failures
in the bad environment as depressed sim-
ply because the environment had only just
switched to the good environment.
(2) It could be argued that depression relates
not to a single decision but to a series of
decisions. In this case, the number of
time steps of not trying (in either environ-
ment) could be used as a measure of de-
pression. However, from an omniscient
perspective, resting is the optimal behav-
iour in the bad environment, so would be
unlikely to be regarded as maladaptive
(or labelled as depression) by others.
(3) As a refinement, the number of time steps
of resting whilst in the good environment
could be used as a measure of depression.
However, because such behaviour is adap-
tive in the bad environment, the possibility
of the environment switching types makes
such a definition questionable.
(4) As an extension to (3), it could be
imposed that the individual has already
tried (at least once) since entering the
good environment. But as they may then
have just been unlucky and had an experi-
ence which happened to be bad, it would
again seem dubious to call such behav-
iour ‘depressed’.
(5) To avoid the earlier problems, it makes
sense to define depression (from a behav-
ioural perspective) as something that can
only be identified in the good environ-
ment, and where the individual has
already experienced success since the
environment has become good. Our most
stringent definition, therefore, is to char-
acterize depression as resting when in the
good environment (i.e. when it would be
better to try), despite having tried and
succeeded since having entered the good
environment.
This final, most stringent, definition captures two
key features of interest. First, from the perspective of
an omniscient observer, the depressive behaviour
itself is not beneficial, since in good conditions it
is always better to try than to rest. Second, the indi-
vidual behaves as though conditions are bad despite
recent evidence to the contrary—namely a success,
which always increases the probability that condi-
tions are good. Later, we show that the stringent
definition of depression can be met even when indi-
viduals follow the optimal strategy.
RESULTS
We assume that the individual starts with no infor-
mation about the current state of the environment
and thus all four states are equally likely (i.e.
P(Eg) = 0.5, P(f) = 0.5). The decision to rest (rather
than try) for numerous time steps can be induced by
a sequence of failures (Fig. 2a). Following the first
decision, the perceived probability that trying is likely
to be rewarded declines because the individual ex-
periences failure. Nothing is learned about the
switching rate on this first update, but subsequent
failures increase the perceived probability that the
switching rate is low. After the first try, the individual
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sometimes chooses to rest. During these periods
of resting, P(Eg) increases due to the possibility of
conditions having switched during that period. P(f)
alters very little when resting, due to the small
meta-switching probability, . Note that as
the length of the sequence of failures increases,
there is an increase in the duration of
resting before the individual tries again; these nu-
merous time steps of not trying would be regarded
as increasing degrees of depression under
Characterization 2.
Following a string of successes, the individual
will keep trying because, with each success, the
perceived probability of reward increases further.
Thus, the individual will only stop trying if it experi-
ences failures. A long sequence of successes
followed by a few failures can lead to very long
periods of resting, because the initial string of
successes leads the individual to believe that the
environment switches only rarely (and the latest data
suggest that conditions are bad). By contrast, a short
sequence of successes followed by a failure indicates
Figure 2. (a) Effect of a sequence of failures on the two probabilities P(Eg) and P(f) for an individual following the optimal
strategy, where the outcome of trying is fixed as a failure. Black markers indicate trying whereas white markers indicate resting.
The values on each axis are each a sum of probabilities; at each data point, P(Eg) = P(Eg, f) P(Eg, s) and P(f) = P(Eg, f) + P(Eb,
f). (b) The effect of a sequence of failures depends strongly on how many successes were previously experienced. The figure
shows two sets of trajectories, each for 40 time steps, each starting at P(Eg) = 0.5, P(f) = 0.5 (indicated by the star symbol). The
solid grey line (triangle markers) corresponds to 20 successes followed by 20 failures. The dashed black line (circle markers)
shows five successes (following the exact same path for those time steps) followed by 35 failures. Following 20 successes, it only
takes a few failures for the individual to decide to rest for a prolonged period (appearing ‘depressed’ by Characterization 2),
because it is relatively sure that current conditions are bad and that the switching rate is slow. However, if the environment has
just switched from bad to good, the resultant behaviour would be regarded as depressed under Characterization 3 and, with one
unlucky outcome, even Characterization 4, as the individual would then be choosing to rest despite being in the good
environment
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that the environment switches frequently and so the
periods of resting will be short (Fig. 2b). Contrasting
the estimates after 40 time steps for the two cases in
Fig. 2b, we see that the history of experiences can
have a long-lasting effect on behaviour (for consid-
erably >20 time steps).
In Fig. 3, we show how the duration of resting
increases with the number of consecutive failures
(i.e. unsuccessful tries) that have been experienced,
and how this depends on the number of consecutive
successes experienced previously. Note that in each
case the duration of resting asymptotes because,
even though conditions may initially have been
bad, the conditions will eventually become good
(as determined by the switching probability).
Counter-intuitively, the response to repeated fail-
ure shown in Fig. 3 following 20 prior successes falls
in between that following 0 prior successes and 5
prior successes. This result is caused by learning
about the environmental switching probability. In
both the 0 and 20 cases, there is good reason after
six failures to think not only that the environment is
currently bad, but that the switching probability is
low. With five successes followed by some failures,
there is more reason to believe that there is a high
switching probability, meaning that more failures
are required before the individual waits a long time
between attempts. Thus, individuals that were pre-
viously used to good conditions for a long time be-
come more thoroughly depressed (according to
length of time not trying) after a sequence of failures.
In the long term (i.e. after 1000 time steps, by which
time the system has settled down to stable values),
the percentage of individuals that are trying in each of
the four environmental situations is as follows: 68%
under good, fast-switching conditions; 91% under
good, slow-switching conditions; 61% under bad,
fast-switching conditions and 18% under bad, slow-
switching conditions. Thus, even when exposed to
good conditions that are unlikely to change soon
(Eg, s), almost one in 10 individuals are inactive.
Under Characterization 1, such individuals (and the
30% not trying under good, fast-switching condi-
tions) would be regarded as depressed.
If good conditions (Eg) persist for an extended
period, the percentage of individuals that try tends
to 100%. This takes some time so that even 20 time
steps after conditions have switched from bad to
good, and there is a significant proportion of indi-
viduals that are inactive. However, the majority of
individuals who are inactive when conditions are
good have switched to those conditions relatively
recently, as shown in Fig. 4.
FORCED ATTEMPTS
The results so far have assumed that each individual
has a free choice of whether to try or rest at each time
step. However, in the real world, individuals are
often ‘forced’ to experience the current environmen-
tal conditions, either through necessity (e.g. the
need to find food to avoid starvation) or because
they are coerced or encouraged (or, more simply,
informed) by others. We therefore incorporated a
fixed probability of being forced to try in any given
time step, and allowed the strategy to take this prob-
ability into account (see Supplementary Appendix).
This allows us to consider the effect of forced at-
tempts on the optimal behavioural choices of when
to try.
Figure 3. The effect of the number of consecutive failures on the waiting time to the next attempt, depending on the number of
previous successes (0, 5 or 20) experienced initially by a naı¨ve individual
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Without forced attempts, individuals should
always try (again) following a success. This is be-
cause an attempt should only have been made if
the individual’s belief that conditions were good,
P(Eg), was sufficiently high to put it in the region of
state space where trying is the better option (see
Fig. 1b) and a success increases this probability.
However, with forced attempts, it is possible for an
individual to experience a failure despite being
within the region of state space where it would have
been better to rest, and the increase in P(Eg) follow-
ing a subsequent forced attempt which is successful
may not be sufficient to move it into the region where
it should try at the next opportunity. The solid line in
Fig. 5 shows the effect of forced attempts on the
proportion of individuals that are inactive under
good conditions, immediately after experiencing a
success. Anticipation of forced attempts can also
make individuals more reluctant to try through their
own volition (Fig. 6). This is because when forced
attempts are anticipated, the informational benefit
of trying is reduced, so the individual should be less
inclined to try when conditions are believed to be
bad (the information gain zone in Fig. 1b is smaller).
This greater reluctance to try leads to longer periods
of inactivity when forced attempts do not occur (i.e.
the anticipated additional data do not arrive).
It is possible that, having switched to good condi-
tions and experienced success, a subsequent run of
bad luck causes an individual to stop trying; this is
shown as the dashed line in Fig. 5. Both mechan-
isms—a forced attempt, or success followed by bad
luck—result in behaviour that, according to our most
stringent Characterization 5, can be characterized as
depression: a small fraction of individuals show in-
activity when environmental conditions are good,
despite having experienced success since environ-
mental conditions became good.
DISCUSSION
We have used a simple model to show that seem-
ingly depressed behaviour can arise from an optimal
strategy when the individual has had an unfortunate
series of experiences, and that the antecedent fac-
tors causing this reactive behaviour could go a long
way back in an individual’s history.
Depression has usually been viewed as a mental
disorder that is maladaptive [35]. However, there
have been a number of recent suggestions that de-
pression represents an adaptive response to com-
plex problems. For example, the analytical
rumination hypothesis and the social navigation hy-
pothesis suggest that depression aids rumination
on difficult social problems and/or influences others
to do a greater share of required work [14, 17, 36–38];
the social risk hypothesis proposes that depression
can minimize the risk of social exclusion by reducing
an individual’s propensity to engage in risky behav-
iours [39, 40]; and the infection-defence hypothesis
proposes that an individual who is susceptible to
illness can reduce the risk if they remove themselves
from company [41, 42], which goes some way to ex-
plaining why depression is, in many ways, similar to
sickness behaviour. Despite providing possible in-
sights into aspects of depression, these adaptive
hypotheses do not account for why low mood can
persist in good conditions.
Figure 4. The proportion of individuals trying in each environmental situation with respect to the time since the last switch of
reward probabilities (Eg to Eb or vice versa). These proportions were calculated from 100 000 individuals each experiencing 2000
time steps
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Rather than arguing that depression is an adap-
tive phenomenon, we take a more nuanced view.
Our model identifies when it is optimal to act, and
when to refrain from taking action. However, the
depressive behaviour that we predict in a small frac-
tion of individuals following this optimal strategy is
not, in itself, beneficial—indeed, our most stringent
definition only regards inactivity as depression if it
would actually be better for the individual to be ac-
tive in those circumstances, and then only if the in-
dividual has gained recent evidence that conditions
are favourable. In short, the optimal strategy we have
identified is adaptive, but the depressed behaviour it
sometimes produces is detrimental (from an omnis-
cient perspective). Our model does not assume that
payoffs are necessarily social or immunological and
suggests that mechanisms supporting such behav-
iour may also evolve in non-social contexts.
Our results are relevant to learned helplessness
[43], in which repeated failures can lead to individ-
uals no longer trying to solve a problem. Seligman
noted the great similarity between depression
and learned helplessness, for instance comparing
impairment of behaviour in naturally occurring de-
pression with induced learned helplessness in la-
boratory settings [44]. Because our analysis is from
an entirely behavioural perspective, it could be said
that our results relate more strongly to learned help-
lessness than to low mood or depression, which are
unobservable psychological states that potentially
Figure 6. The anticipated probability of forced attempts (labels on lines) affects the waiting time to the next attempt when those
forced attempts do not occur. In the baseline case of no forced attempts, the asymptotic waiting time with respect to the number
of failures is 13 resting periods; for a 50% probability of forced attempts this increases to 44 consecutive decisions to rest (i.e.
much more depressed according to Characterization 2)
Figure 5. The proportion of individuals under good conditions that choose to rest (when they have that choice) increases with
the probability of forced attempts, both immediately following a success (solid line) and having already tried and succeeded at
some point since conditions became good (dashed line)
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underlie such behaviours. Learned helplessness is
often considered in the context of the ability of an
individual to control their environment through their
choice of actions [43], though Teodorescu and Erev
[45] suggest that rather than learned helplessness
correlating with perceived controllability of the
environment, reward prevalence (i.e. frequency of
reward) governs exploration. In our model, the indi-
vidual never has control over their environment—
only their behaviour, of whether to engage with the
environment—so the paradigm is subtly different to
the classical view of learned helplessness. Whereas
learned helplessness is most often associated with
failure to avoid costs (such as pain) when they could
be avoided, our approach shows why, from a theor-
etical perspective, individuals can learn not to try for
benefits (such as food) even when they are available.
Keller and Miller [46] point out that severe depres-
sion can be profoundly harmful; so much so that the
behaviour is clearly not adaptive, for instance in the
case of suicide [18]. Although we have not con-
sidered such cases in this article, we have two points
to make on this topic. The first is that, as identified
earlier, many articles on evolutionary psychiatry pre-
sent depression as adaptive in and of itself, whereas
we highlight that even when the behaviour in ques-
tion is not beneficial from the perspective of an om-
niscient observer (in this case, witnessing the
individual resting when the environment is good),
it can have come about through using a strategy
which is evolutionarily adaptive. Second, we have
not dealt with cases where the strategy is non-adap-
tive (as is surely sometimes the case). Nevertheless,
our model indicates that seemingly maladaptive be-
haviour can often be understood from an adaptive
perspective by looking further back into an individ-
ual’s history to antecedent factors. This insight has
implications for the ongoing debate about treatment
options for patients with depressive symptoms.
Kendler and Gardner [47] highlight the difficulty of
inferring causal pathways for the occurrence of de-
pression; by showing that antecedent factors may
have occurred a long time ago, our results encour-
age a similar conclusion.
As well as the differing probabilities of reward,
our model includes two possible environmental
switching rates between those reward conditions.
This somewhat unusual assumption is crucial to
some of our results, because an individual then
learns not only about the current reward probability
but also about how long the reward conditions are
likely to persist. One might typically expect that a
small number of failures should not lead to depres-
sive behaviour. One of the striking results of this
model is that optimal behaviour dictates that a suf-
ficiently long sequence of successes can then result
in ‘giving up’ behaviour after only a small number of
failures, due to the original sequence having
provided evidence that the environmental condi-
tions do not often change. An important assumption
behind this result is that a switch from good to bad
conditions has the same probability of occurrence as
a switch from bad to good conditions. If these
probabilities were not symmetrical, then initial ex-
posure to good conditions might instead tell the in-
dividual that the world is a generally favourable
place, so the individual would therefore be less likely
to give up after a short sequence of failures. In other
words, the assumptions about changes in environ-
mental conditions can have significant effects on
the class of behaviours which emerge from the
modelling.
As well as relating to depression, or low mood
state, our results are directly comparable with
the partial reinforcement extinction effect (PREE)
[48, 49], in which animals that have only occasionally
been rewarded for a particular action continue to
take that action for longer (in the face of repeated
failures) than if the action had previously been re-
warded consistently. In our model, if an individual
has experienced repeated successes, then after a few
consecutive failures the decision will be made to rest
for a considerable period. After more mixed results
of successes and failures followed by constant fail-
ure, an individual will continue to try for a longer
period. Thus this model does, to some extent, ac-
count for the PREE [50, 51]. Recent work on the PREE
has identified that the effect may be governed by how
attractive the options are relative to each other; this
effect can be captured in a model by assuming that
individuals using only very recent data [52]. It would
be interesting to extend our model to allow payoffs to
differ in magnitude to determine whether the
Bayesian approach produces similar behaviour.
Huston et al. [53, p.249] identify that ‘the with-
holding of expected rewards results in extinction of
behaviour and, hypothetically, to depression-like
symptoms.’ This view accords with our model and
Huston et al. show that, in rats, anti-depressants
reduce the tendency to display extinction-induced
withdrawal. The expected benefits (and costs) of
using anti-depressants will depend on circum-
stances, so their use can be debatable [54].
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Signal detection theory [55] tells us that individ-
uals must consider the expected costs and benefits
associated with each option to consistently choose
the best action. Nesse [56, 57] uses signal detection
theory to identify why many defensive actions might
be expressed more readily, and more intensely, than
might otherwise appear to be optimal. If the cost of
mounting an unnecessary defence is small, and the
consequences of not mounting a necessary defence
are large, then the optimal setting will often result in
a tendency towards defensive action that might, to
an omniscient observer, seem overcautious. Nesse
argues that this ‘smoke-detector principle’ can ex-
plain a multitude of defensive actions, such as anx-
iety. Our results also relate to this principle, because
optimal decision making must depend on the ex-
pected cost of unnecessarily trying (when in the
bad environment) and the rewards that are being
missed when not trying in the good environment.
In our model, the immediate payoffs for correct or
incorrect behaviour must be combined with the
longer-term benefit of information acquisition from
trying (Fig. 1b). Although this explore–exploit trade-
off tips the balance towards trying when good and
bad environments are equally likely, it also means
that when not trying, the individual’s information
state alters very little; this can result in periods of
not trying despite being in the good environment.
For simplicity, our model assumes that each indi-
vidual maximizes their long-term rate of reward, but in
many contexts, there are other things to consider. For
instance, with respect to energy levels, an animal will
also need to take more immediate factors, such as the
risk of starvation, into account. In terms of energy, this
model can be regarded as a proxy for maximizing re-
productive success in a situation where the individ-
ual’s reserves are not close to zero or their maximum
value [31]. Models that include energy reserves as a
state variable could produce similar effects to those
we have found (e.g. Nettle [58] does this, though in a
form which assumes the effect rather than showing it).
By focusing on a simple model based on rate of gain,
we have shown that reserve-dependent behaviour is
not required in order for optimal decisions to meet a
stringent criterion for depression. Our simplifying as-
sumptions—that the environment is either good or
bad at any one time and that the switching rate is either
fast or slow, rather than taking a value from a continu-
ous range—certainly do not hold in the real world.
However, these assumptions enable the logic behind
the results to be illustrated clearly and allow tractable
calculations of optimal behaviour, which would not be
possible in a much more complicated model.
Our model is not species-specific, which suggests
that more work on models of depression in
non-human animals may be instructive [59, 60].
However, as models become more specific (e.g.
focusing on social competition), great care will be
required in extrapolating conclusions from other
species to humans. For instance, in rodents, the
usual depression mechanism of mammals may
have been adapted to result in hibernation [61].
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) distinguishes between major de-
pressive disorders and ‘normal’ sadness. One recent
debate has focussed on the distinction between de-
pression and normal grieving. DSM-IV included a
‘bereavement exclusion’, suggesting that people
should not be diagnosed as having a depressive dis-
order within a couple of months of bereavement.
However, the most recent version of the DSM (5)
has removed this exclusion. The model presented
here is not suitable for addressing the issue of be-
reavement exclusion because the only costs are
small ones of trying (when it would be better to rest)
rather than high magnitude losses such as bereave-
ment. However, it may be possible to build similar
models that incorporate loss magnitude to help ad-
dress the question of whether bereavement should
exclude the diagnosis of a depressive disorder.
From a clinical perspective, there are many forms
and characterizations of depression, with psycho-
motor activity being most reduced in the case of
melancholic depression [62]. Our approach has
taken the simplistic view of characterizing depres-
sive behaviour as inactivity when it would be better
to try. However, our model only relates to the react-
ive phenomena characteristic of non-melancholic
forms of depression, which are the more common
[63]. Consequently, our model does not account for
the reduced psychomotor activity of melancholic (or
endogenous) forms of depression.
In this article, we have identified a strategy for
maximizing the reward rate when an individual’s
only control over the situation is deciding which op-
tion to take. A somewhat deeper sense of the term
‘depression’ may relate not so much to the immedi-
ate action as to one’s perceived ability to control
subsequent (currently unknown) situations, leading
depressed individuals to avoid situations which are
less controllable (e.g. social situations). We believe
that understanding this issue, which may be funda-
mental to developing more effective treatments, will
Depression and adaptive learning Trimmer et al. | 133
be greatly assisted by taking an evolutionary
approach.
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